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Perceived Risks of Mountain Landslides in Italy: 1 
Stated Choices for Subjective Risk Reductions 2 
 3 
Abstract 4 
Mountain landslides have occurred in countries such as Italy regularly throughout recorded history, 5 
often resulting in fatalities. Because of this, policies that would reduce landslide fatality risk need to be 6 
carefully formulated. As a first step in the exploration of preferences for these risk-reducing policies, we 7 
examine public perceptions of risk for landslides and related events. Subjective probabilities for others 8 
who might die in a landslide, as well as one’s own subjective probability of death are elicited for a 9 
sample of visitors and residents of a region in Italy prone to landslides. We present one portion of the 10 
sample with scientific information and allow them to update their risk estimate if they so choose, 11 
allowing the role of such information to be tested. The subjective probabilities are then used to 12 
construct risk-related attributes in a pivot-design version of a conventional stated choice model. Larger 13 
risk changes as departures from the baseline risk are found to be significant in explaining choices. 14 
 15 
Key words: risk perception, mountain landslides, subjective probabilities, Discrete Choice Experiments. 16 
 17 
.  18 
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1. Introduction 19 
     In this manuscript we present the results of a survey on risk perceptions of mountain landslides in 20 
Italy and results from stated choice or preference (SP) models for policy programs to reduce these risks. 21 
The SP modeling allows recovery of maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to reduce these risks. To our 22 
knowledge, while there is a good deal of literature published on the science of landslides, there is very 23 
little literature on the economic damages of these, and less so on empirical estimates of WTP to reduce 24 
landslide risks. Exceptions are Vranken et al. (2013) and other papers that consider the costs associated 25 
with repair and rebuilding, or lost property values. Vranken et al. (2013) also consider changes in 26 
amenity values for forests and grasslands. To our knowledge, no one prior to our study has considered 27 
WTP to reduce landslide risks using the SP or discrete choice experiment (DCE) approach (hereafter DCE) 28 
that we use, and which is explained below. 29 
     Landslides frequently occur in the Dolomites (Italian North-Eastern Alps): two people died inside their 30 
house in the summer of 2009, hit by a landslide. Floods and mountain region landslides also result in 31 
many casualties in Taiwan every year (Ho et al. 2008; Lin et al. 2008). Extreme weather events contribute 32 
to this frequency and are on the increase. Future policy actions require better guidance on risk 33 
preferences to become more efficient. Some more background on landslide science, admittedly a simple 34 
overview, may help motivate the reader. 35 
     In mountainous regions, as in the area under this investigation, landslides can be very fast and when 36 
this is the case, they are perhaps better known as debris flows. Such flows take the form of rapid, 37 
gravity-induced mass movements consisting of a mixture of water, sediment, wood and anthropogenic 38 
debris propagating along channels on mountain slopes or debris fans.  Flows in the Dolomites region of 39 
Italy (Gregoretti and Dalla Fontana, 2008), as well as in the French Alps (Theule et al. 2012) and in the 40 
Rocky Mountains of the U.S. (Coe et al, 2008; McCoy et al., 2012), usually occur because of the 41 
2 
 
mobilization of sediment accumulated in the bed of channels incising a debris fan, caused by runoff 42 
descending from upstream cliffs and slopes.  43 
     Hydrodynamic forces exerted by stream flow over a debris bed on very steep slopes cause the 44 
entrainment of a large quantity of sediments after which a solid-liquid mixture forms (Gregoretti, 2000). 45 
The routing path of debris flows in the upper part of the fan is usually straight, but it can deviate in the 46 
medium and in the lower part: when the slope decreases the debris flow usually spreads out (Iverson et 47 
al., 1998; Takahashi, 2007; D'Agostino et al., 2010). These phenomena severely impact the areas they 48 
cross, due to the high speed [up to 10 meters per second (m/s)] and the large volumes of mobilized 49 
sediment. The design of carefully constructed hazard maps therefore plays a crucial role for any risk 50 
analysis against debris flows. Hazard mapping involves the identification of those areas historically or 51 
potentially threatened by debris flows. 52 
     These problems are common in parts of Italy, the country providing the data and focus for this paper. 53 
Each year Italian landslides and related mountain area floods not only occur regularly, but they also 54 
frequently kill or injure people (Salvati et al. 2010). In the period from 1950 to 2008, the two Italian 55 
regions that experienced the highest number of events that caused human casualties were Trentino-Alto 56 
Adige and Campania. Though there is some uncertainty associated with estimates, the information 57 
provided by the historical records is of good quality: the first landslide for which the exact number of 58 
deaths is known occurred in the year 843. Salvati et al. (2010) suggest that during the 1,166 year period 59 
from 843 to 2008, there were 1,562 known landslide events, resulting in almost 16,000 casualties. 60 
     Steps can be taken to reduce the risks from debris flow related to property damage, injury, or loss of 61 
human life. These range in scale and expense, as well as for specific target populations. For example, 62 
some policies would reduce damage to residential homes, while others mainly focus on reducing damage 63 
to public roads and to actual people exposed to landslide risk. 64 
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     In this study we collect preference data in order to implement our DCE approach.  By making choices 65 
during a survey, our sample respondents evaluate programs to reduce landslide risks. Such experiments, 66 
and the resulting empirical models, can make use of direct scientific estimates of the probability of 67 
landslides and fatal landslides such as found in Salvati et al. (2010). Such an approach leads to a class of 68 
economic models known based on expected utility (EU) theory, or to some derivations of the EU theory 69 
model. In such EU models, individuals are assumed to be expected utility maximizers and are assumed to 70 
face well-known and understood risks (i.e. known population or average probabilities of the risky 71 
events). 72 
     Despite the widespread use of the EU framework, individuals very often have been found to make 73 
decisions based on what they believe risks to be and not on the basis of what scientists estimate risks to 74 
be, and these might be quite different. For example, a person who builds a beautiful mountain home in 75 
the path of debris (in the middle of a steep mountain valley) might believe the probability of a landslide 76 
destroying their home is quite small, while a scientist might estimate this probability to be much larger. 77 
The mountain home is likely built for its scenic view and access to mountain trails. The home owner 78 
probably focuses on these positive amenities, and not on what are perhaps strongly correlated landslide 79 
risks. This homeowner’s belief could be biased in favor of the outcome the individual desires (i.e. belief 80 
that there will be few or no landslides in the area where his or her otherwise beautifully situated home 81 
is). 82 
      In what follows, we assume that individuals choosing among programs to reduce risks from 83 
landslides, or not, do so according to their own beliefs about these risks. Thus, as a first step, we elicit 84 
several estimates of what people believe the related probabilities of landslides and their impacts are. We 85 
can then determine how different these beliefs are from what the best available science suggests 86 
landslide are for the region. 87 
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2. Background Literature on DCE 88 
     The review here focuses on the discrete choice experiment model. We are aware that there is a very 89 
long literature on eliciting and modeling subjective risks or risk perceptions, and space simply does not 90 
allow that here. The reader unfamiliar with this is referred to Shaw and Woodward (2008), or more 91 
recently, Shaw (2013 or 2016) and Wibbenmeyer et al. (2013) for reviews of relevant literature on 92 
perceived risks. In this section we very briefly review the relevant DCE literature, discussing previous 93 
efforts to incorporate risk into the DCE framework. 94 
2.1 Stated Discrete Choice Experiments 95 
     DCE approaches present alternative hypothetical and/or real scenarios to individuals that feature 96 
attributes that vary, and allow individuals to choose between the alternative. The central idea is that 97 
individuals make choices as a function of the characteristics of the scenarios, similar to the way that 98 
individuals choose to purchase goods and services on the basis of the cost and characteristics they offer. 99 
DCEs are especially valuable when the scenarios involve choice alternatives we might be interested in, 100 
but which are not actually available at the present time. Examples are newly proposed roads and 101 
transportation routes or brand new products being test-marketed. 102 
     DCE studies are now quite common in many areas of applied economics (marketing, transportation, 103 
health, environment, and medicine --- see for example, Louviere and Woodworth, 1983; Hensher et al., 104 
2005 and 2011; Adamowicz et al., 1998; Scarpa et al. 2010). DCE’s have been shown to be potentially 105 
consistent with incentive compatibility, and, or, that the choices that people make have consequences 106 
(e.g. Carlsson and Martinsson 2001, Lusk and Schroeder 2004, Vossler, Doyon and Rondeau 2012). One 107 
way of testing for the validity of responses to hypothetical scenarios is to blend these with real scenarios. 108 
For example, in transportation studies, subjects can be asked about actual commuting routes or choices 109 
they recently made, as well as newly proposed routes, and formal tests of the difference in responses 110 
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can be constructed (see Adamowicz et al. 1998, for example). We cannot include real scenarios in the 111 
current study because there is currently no actual data to allow this, and no subject would volunteer to 112 
actually experience a risky landslide in some dreadfully constructed experiment; such morbid 113 
experiments are of course now banned by human subjects research boards around the world. 114 
      The standard DCE model assumes that the person making the decision faces certainty. Errors that are 115 
part of the model are assumed to be measurement error, or unobservables on the part of the 116 
researcher. The estimating equation that allows us to estimate the probability of a particular choice 117 
follows the discrete choice literature because the subject is typically only provided with a few discrete 118 
choices to make in the context of a survey (as opposed to a continuous quantity of choices). These 119 
situations lead nicely to the conditional logit or probit models (when there is a simple binary choice), or 120 
the multinomial logit model, for several (more than two) choices.  121 
     Underlying these DCE models are theory-based random utilities, i.e. utility that a person derives 122 
conditional on a choice being made, coupled with an error term. Essentially, the utility from choice A is 123 
compared to the utility from choice B, leading to a “utility difference” model. The probability that a 124 
person chooses alternative A versus B, versus C or D takes a mathematical form that is based on the 125 
error terms.  We postpone further discussion of the DCE to a section below, where we can also include 126 
the introduction of risk. 127 
2.2 Risk in Choice Experiments 128 
     Several efforts have now been made to incorporate risk into the context of DCEs (there has been a 129 
rapid explosion in the transportation choice literature: see Huang et al. 2015 for many references). These 130 
efforts include specifying the risk or probability that a program among those to choose from will actually 131 
be successful, and also including outcome-related risk (e.g. Glenk and Colombo 2013; Wibbenmeyer et 132 
al. 2013). Ideally, we want the specification and development of a DCE to adhere to economic theory 133 
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under conditions of risk or uncertainty. A DCE may conform carefully to the expected utility framework 134 
or one of its variants, such as cumulative prospect theory (e.g. Huang et al. 2015; Wibbenmeyer et al. 135 
2013; Hensher et al. 2011). Several previous DCE studies are eloquently described in Rolfe and Windle 136 
(2015), Huang et al. (2015), Shaw (2016), or Cerroni (2013) and will not be repeated here. 137 
     To our knowledge, no previous studies have elicited stated risks or subjective probabilities and used 138 
these within a CE model, with the exception of Cerroni et al. (2016).  The latter paper formally elicits 139 
probabilities using the somewhat complicated exchangeability method (see Cerroni et al. 2012) and then 140 
incorporates those into a CE context to determine whether subjects cling to their own estimates of 141 
subjective probability, and mentally adjust those which are externally provided to them as baseline risk 142 
conditions in the survey. 143 
     This phenomenon is consistent with the idea behind probability weighting, wherein a person might be 144 
told that the best scientific estimate of the probability of an event is 0.02 and then the person weights 145 
that number so that it is processed internally to be a much higher, or lower number. This non-linear 146 
probability weighting is of course central to non-expected utility theories such as prospect theory 147 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Huang et al. 2015), but the use of subjective probabilities in Non EU 148 
models, while desirable, is not necessary. For example, Wibbenmeyer et al. (2013) incorporate such 149 
probability weighting in their prospect-theory style DCE, but do not use subjective probabilities that 150 
wildfire managers might have to model their choices for strategies that might protect resources from 151 
wildfires. Similarly, Huang et al. 2015 allow for probability weighting of risks of arriving late in 152 
commuting, but they do not use subjective probabilities either. 153 
     To incorporate subjective probabilities into our DCE we just ask individuals to state what they believe 154 
the probabilities of landslides and associated mortality are. This is likely the most commonly used, and 155 
simplest approach in elicitation of the probabilities that people believe hold for events. It does have the 156 
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possible advantage over more complicated methods of reduced respondent fatigue, which is important 157 
when surveys (such as ours) involve several other decision-making tasks. 158 
     A simple, two choice or two state model helps the reader see what we do in a utility difference model 159 
with subjective probabilities or risks (see Shaw, 2016 for a more complete description of this type of 160 
model). Let indirect utility be V. Let the subjective probability of a landslide be π. Suppose income is Y, 161 
and a vector of other variables that influence a choice be X. The usual additive error term is ε.  162 
1) ooo CYXV   )(   with no chance of death; no landslide 163 
2) 111 )(   IYXV   I is indicator for death with landslide, with probability, π 164 
In other words, the landslide happens if I = 1; = 0 if not. Thus, utility in (1) represents the case where the 165 
landslide does not happen, and in (2) it happens with subjective probability, π.  In equation (1), a WTP is 166 
C, and it is subtracted from income if one is willing to choose an alternative with safety and with a 167 
payment option (see the two choice “contingent valuation” model of Riddel and Shaw (2006), which is 168 
quite similar to above; in fact a binary choice contingent valuation is a special case of a two alternative 169 
DCE model, where one of the alternatives has the “status quo” attribute levels. 170 
     In a formal risk context we want to take the expected utility difference, or: 171 
3)   CXVVE o ],[ 1  172 
Where ooXXX   11 ;   173 
The expected utility difference in (3) leads to the estimating equation, which takes the form of the 174 
probability of choosing state 0 or state 1. In our model below, we have several alternatives from which 175 
the individual can choose, so the structure is similar, but it is more complicated than the above because 176 
of having more than two alternatives. The main thing to note is that having a “probability” like π as an 177 
explanatory variable in a discrete choice model can indeed be motivated formally from the above. 178 
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3. Survey and Samples Design 179 
     All data collection efforts used for our study involved a survey conducted using in-person interviews. 180 
Unlike the potential in a mail survey, the respondent could not peek ahead to later parts of the survey, 181 
and possibly go back and change initial responses. Peeking ahead in a survey could be a problem when 182 
asking for a raw prior estimate of probability , as some individuals may wish to look ahead at 183 
information, then go back and change their original answer to avoid looking silly or uninformed. Our 184 
survey questionnaire broadly encompassed two sections: the first part collected information about risk 185 
beliefs or perceptions and involved the elicitation of each individual’s numerical estimates of probability 186 
as well as the socio-economic data. The second part of the survey involved the DCE application. The DCE 187 
part of the survey is described extensively in the design section (below).  188 
3.1 Survey and Samples 189 
     Eight different versions of the survey were given to a sample of respondents in the region during the 190 
summer of 2012. Two broad categories or versions are the surveys intended for those who own homes 191 
in the region, and second, those intended for visitors. We might expect some key differences between 192 
these two broad target groups, in terms of both risk beliefs or perceptions, and support for risk 193 
reduction programs. As compared to temporary visitors, the home owners are expected to be more 194 
familiar with the region, depending on the length of time they have owned a home for, and they are 195 
expected to be exposed to landslide risks more often because of either their residential location and or 196 
their more frequent or extensive travel within a region subjected to such risk.  Each of these might lead 197 
to different estimates of landslide risk for the two groups of people. 198 
     Thus, while many of the same questions were asked of each and every respondent, several specific 199 
questions were specifically catered to the homeowners, and others were only given to visitors. For 200 
example, visitors were asked about the distance of their home from the region, and the number of trips 201 
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they take to the region, while homeowners were asked questions about the property they own within 202 
the region.  203 
      Table 1 describes the key general features of these eight versions, and shows the number of 204 
respondents for each version. Further versions of the survey were produced depending on whether the 205 
survey provided scientific information about landslides (mostly historical, but also presenting some 206 
information on how they occur, and when. Naturally, information an individual is given might affect his 207 
or her belief about risks are, and providing information to some, but not all of the sample allows 208 
examination of this. Four versions also offered actual payment for elicited risks that came close to the 209 
true risks (approximately following the probability scoring method approach – see discussion in Shaw, 210 
2013; 2016). Those who are given this scientific information were told that between the years from 1960 211 
to 2011 scientists estimated that an average of about 9 out of 1 million people per year were killed by a 212 
landslide.  213 
Table 1 about here 214 
     Many previous studies of risk perception suggest that risks as small as the landslide risk are difficult 215 
for people to process and understand fully. Subjects who accurately predicted risk estimates connected 216 
to landslides had a chance of being drawn randomly, and paid, although unlike a lottery outcome, there 217 
is no direct and tight corresponding relationship between the monetary award and the risk outcome. For 218 
example, a probability scoring approach could be used to devise a reward and penalty scheme where the 219 
reward shrinks when larger errors are made by the respondent compared to the “true” mortality risk 220 
ranking. We don’t do this, but we still expect that the chance of winning some money for correct guesses 221 
inspired more care and effort by respondents when forming the risk estimate. 222 
     Table 2 reports simple demographic statistics for each of the survey versions, homeowners and 223 
visitors. Figures 1 and 2 provide more detailed information about the distribution of age and income for 224 
both of the subsamples. We might have expected that visitors are younger, in general, than 225 
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homeowners, but there is a noticeable spike in the oldest visitor group. While we might expect some 226 
other key differences, there are in fact similarities between the two sub groups in most overlapping 227 
descriptive variables. However, about 1/6th of the Visitor sample reports sometimes engaging in risky 228 
activities, whereas that fraction is twice as large, at about 1/3rd for the Homeowner sample. In addition, 229 
while both groups have a huge proportion of people who have heard of landslide problems in Italy, a 230 
much larger percentage of homeowners had lost a friend or relative due to these, than had those in the 231 
Visitor group. 232 
Table 2 about here 233 
3.2 DCE Question Design 234 
     The second part of the survey offered each individual in the sample the opportunity to choose among 235 
policies to reduce landslide risks. These ranged from the status quo (do nothing new so that status quo 236 
conditions continue to pertain) to fairly aggressive risk reduction policy programs that come at a 237 
substantial cost. There are many experimental design and survey issues to address in the context of 238 
choice experiments (e.g. Scarpa and Rose, 2008; Louviere et al., 2000; Rose et al., 2011), but virtually 239 
none of the studies we know of incorporate the subject’s perceived risks or subjective probabilities, as 240 
we do below. As mentioned above, one important exception is the new work by Cerroni et al. (2016), 241 
which builds on the earlier PhD dissertation by Cerroni (2013). [We are aware that several researchers 242 
have incorporated subjective probabilities into other types of behavioral models, such as contingent 243 
valuation.] 244 
     As noted above, the stated choice surveys differed, depending on whether the respondent lived in the 245 
region (homeowners) or was a temporary visitor, or tourist: the key attributes used to explain 246 
differences in alternatives were catered to fit the category for the respondent (see the list of attributes 247 
in Table 3).  248 
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     One attribute of a choice alternative was used for both groups, which is the risk reduction variable or 249 
attribute. All respondents were presented with operational and realistic programs aiming at reducing 250 
risks of debris flows. They were all presented with baseline (status quo) levels or characterizations of the 251 
debris flows. They are then told that the programs would reduce their own estimate of risk by certain 252 
percentage levels. In both groups the subjects see programs involving a 25%, 50% and 75% reduction in 253 
their baseline risk, and the tourists additionally see a 33% (1/3) risk reduction program. Homeowners 254 
face different levels of a reduction in their house insurance premium of the house of increased safety 255 
(3%, 5%, 7%, and 10%). They also see different levels of potential increase in the value of their home 256 
because of the risk reduction (0.5%, 1% and 3%), relative to the baseline value of their own home.  257 
The payment mechanism used to support the risk reductions for the Homeowners was a new property 258 
tax increase, with levels which were 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20%. In the case of Visitors instead, the payment 259 
mechanism was a toll (in Euros – the Italian currency) on the road used to gain access to the region. It 260 
was explained to the survey respondent that the toll would be used to collect revenue in order to 261 
support the debris flow risk reduction program. Toll rates were .50, 1, 2, or 3 Euros. Visitors also are 262 
presented with other commuting or route attributes: levels of scenic beauty (low, medium and high), 263 
and travel times of 2, 3, and 4 hours. 264 
     All respondents were asked to choose among three alternatives in each choice set, where one 265 
alternative was the status quo (SQ) that involved no additional cost. The SQ alternative gave them the 266 
opportunity to reject all the attribute levels offered within the risk reducing alternatives. An example of 267 
one choice-set for Homeowners is given in Table 4.1   268 
Two different experimental designs were developed for the homeowners and visitors to arrange 269 
attributes and levels in choice sets. In both cases the designs have 58 combinations (choice-tasks), which 270 
are blocked into 7 blocks of 8 choice tasks each. The designs were constructed using a Bayesian D-271 
                                                          
1
 An example of a typical choice set for a visiting Tourist is available from the authors, on request. 
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efficient optimal criterion (see Sandor and Wedel 2001; Ferrini and Scarpa 2007; Rose and Bliemer 2009) 272 
based on parameter estimates obtained from pilot studies previously conducted on visitors and 273 
homeowners. The point and interval estimates from the pilot study surveys2 were used to inform the 274 
prior distribution for the Bayesian design. The pilot and the final designs were developed by using the 275 
Ngene v.1© (ChoiceMetrics 2010) software package3.  276 
Table 3 and 4 about here 277 
4. Results 278 
Basic risk results are offered in the section below, whereas in the section 4.1.2 the results of a 279 
conventional empirical CE model are presented. 280 
4.1 Risk Responses 281 
     Each survey, whether given to homeowners or visitors, asked several different risk questions of each 282 
respondent, allowing recovery of estimates of an individual’s risk belief or subjective probability. Some 283 
descriptive statistical results are reported in Table 5. After asking about familiarity with landslides (e.g. 284 
exposure to television or media coverage), each respondent was initially asked what they believed the 285 
typical annual probability of a landslide happening in the region was, providing an estimate of probability 286 
without providing any information. We call this variable PRL. The average response for PRL was higher 287 
for the Homeowners, who thought the chance was about 70%, than for the Visitors, who thought this to 288 
be about 64%, on average. Though it is certainly not the same risk concept, the reader here should 289 
remember that the science-based mortality risk is 9 in 1 million, so these estimates are orders or 290 
magnitude larger. However, landslides of course do not always end up resulting in mortality. We would 291 
expect that PRL is greater than or equal to the probability of fatalities from landslides: logically, it cannot 292 
                                                          
2
 Two orthogonal designs were developed for the pilot surveys in order to address homeowners and visitors 
respectively. In both cases 18 respondents were interviewed in order to derive priors for the following Bayesian 
designs. 
3
 Design statistics can be obtained upon request from the corresponding author. 
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be smaller. Still, this different in magnitude is quite large. This kind of over-estimation is not unusual in 293 
the risk elicitation literature (e.g. Riddel and Shaw 2006, find that respondents overestimate the risks 294 
associated with nuclear waste storage by orders of magnitude, as compared to science-based estimates). 295 
     Next, each respondent was asked what they thought the chance of a landslide which would actually 296 
kill at least one person was, in a typical year.  By taking these incremental steps in building up to 297 
mortality risk, which combines the probability of a landslide with the probability of deaths, we believed 298 
people could better understand the risk. We label this second probability the PRFL (probability of a fatal 299 
landslide). Subjects were reminded that a landslide could happen, but not kill anyone, so our a-priori 300 
expectation was that that PRFL should be smaller, or equal to, but not larger than the first landslide risk 301 
estimate (PRL).  For both groups, the number was indeed considerably smaller and almost identical for 302 
both groups: homeowners estimated a 46% chance of a fatal landslide, and visitors, a 47% chance. Recall 303 
that each respondent was provided no information by us at this point in their taking of the survey, about 304 
anything pertaining to scientists’ thoughts about risks. However, again note that these estimates are 305 
orders of magnitude larger than science-based estimates of the mortality risk from landslides. The 306 
probabilities are not directly comparable because PRFL only asks about chances of any fatal landslide. All 307 
that we would expect here is that subjects would not make gross contradictory statements, such as PRFL 308 
= 0, coupled with an estimate of huge death rates, or PRFL = 100%, coupled with a zero death rate. 309 
     Many specialists in risk communication have found that the simplest, or least confusing task for 310 
laypersons is to estimate a number of fatalities, out of some population (e.g. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage 311 
1995). Thus, following these landslide probability elicitation tasks, each respondent was asked how many 312 
people in the region, out of about 5 million residents plus the annual visitors, would be killed in the next 313 
year (2013) following the data collection year (2012). Again, here they were initially provided no 314 
scientific information, so this death rate (DR1) might be considered their prior estimate of subjective 315 
probability [roughly a death rate of X (their estimate) per 5 million]. After recoding the categorical data, 316 
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the data suggested that Homeowners estimated there would be about 9.3 deaths, while Visitors 317 
estimated there would be about 13 deaths. These then, are much closer to the science-based estimates 318 
of mortality or death rates from landslides, which are 9 per million (or, scaling up, 45 per 5 million). They 319 
are a bit lower than the science-based estimates: for Homeowners, the prior estimate is about 1.8 320 
deaths per million. The numbers are similar for the visitors’ sample. 321 
     Following this particular question, a sub-sample of both groups were provided with the survey 322 
information that described what scientists knew about landslide frequency, and how these occur, as well 323 
as the historical rates of fatalities4. It would be reasonable for a person who digested and believed the 324 
information provided, to conclude that there would be at least an average of 9 deaths per million people 325 
in a typical year, and then factor in a population of 5 million, and then perhaps estimate a number five 326 
times the annual 9, to arrive at a second estimate of the death rate (DR2), as 45 deaths. 327 
      Of the 105 homeowners, 72 were provided with the scientific information, and of the 63 visitors, 46 328 
were provided with the information. They were actually first asked about their own annual (in a typical 329 
year) chance of dying in conjunction with a landslide, which is a probability of own death we deem as 330 
PROD. Note that this question was not asked before information was given, and thus, those not provided 331 
information (50 in total) were not asked this “your own chance of death” question at all. Many risk 332 
elicitation researchers (e.g. Slovic 2001) expect that one’s estimate of one’s own chance of death will be 333 
found to be smaller than a similar estimate for the population, or using our definitions, if we agreed, 334 
we’d expect that PROD < DR1 or DR2.  This is what some psychologists deem optimism bias, and this kind 335 
of bias has been found in the context of hurricanes, as well as other contexts such as cigarette smoking. 336 
The thought is that for a risk-taking behavior like smoking, or owning a home or hiking in landslide-prone 337 
region, the individual believes “it won’t happen to me.” Of course, dread can play a role and result in 338 
                                                          
4
 The complete survey versions are available at this link xxx, whereas additional statistical results can be obtained 
upon request from the authors. 
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over-estimation of one’s own chance of death, as compared to scientific evidence, so this is an empirical 339 
issue. 340 
     Caution might be used in comparing an elicited chance in percentage terms with a death rate in 341 
frequency terms. However, note that for both groups, the average estimated chance of their own death 342 
is in fact far larger than the average subjective estimate they provided for the region. We are not 343 
suggesting this simple comparison of means approach is flawless, and of course we are not yet 344 
controlling for other factors that might explain variation in subjective probability estimates.5 For 345 
example, a particular homeowner might reasonably and accurately place her own chance of dying in a 346 
landslide to be zero because she knows her home is well out of the path of debris, and that she rarely 347 
drives on roads where exposure to landslide debris would be possible. Conversely, she might put a huge 348 
probability on the chance of death because her home is directly in the path of potential debris, should it 349 
slide. 350 
     It is quite interesting to note that subjects were apparently unable or unwilling, however, to lower 351 
their risk estimate to correspond to the percentage chance implied by the scientific estimate of average 352 
deaths per year. Using one million as the base, we can roughly compare the scientific rate of 9 per 353 
million to 15%, or the implied 150,000 deaths per one million. Thus, the subjects, on average, hugely 354 
over-estimate even their own chance of being killed. The Visitor’s average rate is lower, but is still 355 
consistent with huge death rates (90,000 out of one million) as compared to science-based estimates. 356 
This result corroborates previous research findings that people have difficulty thinking in probabilistic 357 
terms, and perhaps make math mistakes when converting mortality rates to death probabilities, and vice 358 
versa. 359 
                                                          
5
 For example, a problem with the comparison of one’s own chance of death to the chance for the average person 
is that the presumption is that the subject doing the evaluation knows everything about what the average person in 
the population is like. 
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     After this own estimate, subjects were asked to consider again the number of expected deaths in the 360 
coming year, for the region. As noted above, they may well have guessed as many as 45 out of 5 million 361 
people would die in 2013, corresponding to the scientific information. Note that in both cases, after 362 
reading the information provided, the average estimates actually do increase slightly, although not up to 363 
the 45 in 5 million estimate. In some cases (with the risk information provided) these could be 364 
considered to be akin to Bayesian updates of the earlier response, following the processing of the 365 
information provided to them.  For example, in simple Bayesian learning models, several economists 366 
have formulated a model of a posterior risk as a function that combines the respondent’s prior risk 367 
estimate and information content given to them.  368 
     Quite often the prior is unavailable in empirical studies and must be substituted for in an empirical 369 
model by using a simple constant term, however, it is available to us here. We note that while, on 370 
average, the 2nd estimate of deaths went up as compared to the prior, some people indeed reduced their 371 
estimate of risk, or did not adjust it up or down from their prior, perhaps reflecting individual 372 
heterogeneity in Bayesian updating. 373 
      As mentioned above, about one half of the survey respondents were offered a chance to be 374 
randomly drawn and receive actual payment if their risk estimate corresponded with events that unfold 375 
the next year. Knowing whether this is the case required waiting until the end of 2013, but we did 376 
explore the effect of the offered payment. Conditional means are not significantly different between the 377 
group offered payment, and the group offered no payment. 378 
Table 5 about here 379 
       To further explore cross sectional variation in risk estimates we estimated some simple regression 380 
models with the stated risk estimates being the dependent variable, and various independent or 381 
explanatory variables used as additional controls. Previous work by risk researchers in various fields, 382 
including psychology, sociology, medical science, and economics, has found several factors that correlate 383 
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with stated or revealed subjective probability estimates6. Common findings are that the characteristics of 384 
the risky event matter (e.g. Ho et al. 2008), that women often believe risks to be higher than men, that 385 
race may matter (e.g. Finucane et al. 2000), and that age, and education may influence estimates of risk, 386 
although the pattern in the latter two is not simply in one direction.  As an example of investigating the 387 
role of education, Katapodi et al. (2004) conduct a meta analysis of studies of the perceived risk of breast 388 
cancer and find mixed results (i.e. sometimes there is no influence, and sometimes more or fewer years 389 
of education does influence estimates of risk), while Finucane et al. (2000) note that race and education 390 
may be correlated and lead to confusion about effects. One cannot say that it is always true that more 391 
educated people believe risks to be lower, or higher than those with less education. Still, some factors 392 
may serve as substitutes for ability to cognitively process information or for emotional reactions (e.g. 393 
Wibbenmeyer et al. 2013), or for experiences that people have had that may be closely related to the 394 
risky situation being assessed, or for exposure to information provided by the media or other sources. 395 
         Respondents were asked what their fear of certain phenomena was, on a scale of 1 (not at all 396 
frightened) to 5 (very frightened). Fear or dread can be related to subjective risk estimates: more fear of 397 
some event or activity often leads a person to overestimate risk.  The fear of a particular event, such as 398 
having a car accident, might be correlated with fear of other events, such as a fire, or having an accident 399 
at work. Table 6 reports frequencies for the fear variables and correlations between these for the entire 400 
pooled sample. 401 
      The highest single percentage category in the top half of Table 6 is for those who do not fear having 402 
an accident at work, which reflects occupations with low risks of accidents, or possible unemployment. 403 
For the strongest fears in the group, it appears that serious illness, earthquakes, and floods are about 404 
equally strongly feared by a third of the sample. The strongest pairwise correlation is between fear of 405 
                                                          
6
 There are hundreds of relevant papers. We take a space-saving measure and refer the reader to dozens of 
references and discussion in the lengthy survey paper by Shaw (2016). 
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floods and fear of earthquakes. Avalanche and fire, and avalanche and accidents at work are also 406 
noteworthy in the correlation. 407 
        Much of the previous work that explores correlations like this, most particularly by psychologists, 408 
has involved simple pair-wise correlations between one factor and the stated risk estimate, but more 409 
recently, economists (in contrast to many psychologists) have estimated regression-style models that 410 
control for several factors at once. There is no exact economic theory underlying model specification, so 411 
we rely on previous indications that some variables might matter, as well as intuition. Unfortunately, the 412 
Visitor sample is somewhat small at 63 subjects, and thus, subsamples, such as the number (46) of those 413 
who answered the own death chance and the updated death chance questions, do not lend themselves 414 
to trying huge numbers of independent variables in regression analysis. 415 
Table 6 about here 416 
      We explored the variation in the subjective probability and death estimates using simple Ordinary 417 
Least Squares (OLS) regression models. Stated probabilities are actually variables that might not conform 418 
to the normal distribution assumed in OLS regressions (the bounds on possible values are zero and one, 419 
not minus and plus infinity, as with the normal distribution), but more sophisticated econometric 420 
approaches, such as using maximum likelihood and the Beta distribution (see Riddel and Shaw, 2006), 421 
are not pursued here. 422 
      Some interesting key regression results for the Visitor sample were that higher levels of education 423 
significantly increased the samples’ basic landslide risk estimate, while distance traveled to the region 424 
was significantly and negatively related to this estimate.  No other variables proved to be robust in terms 425 
of their significance in the various models we tried. The distance variable maintained its sign and 426 
importance in the first of the fatal landslide models, and fear of avalanches was positively and 427 
significantly associated with higher estimates. In a model of the first risk response (the prior, for those 428 
receiving later information) to estimate the number of annual deaths, the avalanche variable had the 429 
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same effect, and interestingly, income had a weakly significant and negative effect on the death 430 
estimate. 431 
       For the Homeowner sample, the most consistent variable of any significance in the landslide risk 432 
regressions was gender:  women in all estimated models had higher subjective estimates of the risk than 433 
men. In the fatal landslide model, this gender result was maintained, and fear of avalanches had a 434 
positive and significant influence on stated probabilities. Results were similar for the first estimate of 435 
death rates for the region. Perhaps surprisingly, age and education did not prove to be significant 436 
determinants of risk for the Homeowner sample. 437 
       Several simple OLS regression models were also estimated for the pooled sample of both the 438 
Homeowners and Visitors. Table 7 reports results for two of the more interesting models: the first is the 439 
basic annual probability of any landslide occurring, and the second model is the probability of a deadly 440 
landslide in a typical year for people in the region. Note that the level of education is significant in both 441 
models, but has the opposite sign in each: more education raises basic landslide risk estimates, but being 442 
more educated lowers the estimate of the probability of fatal landslides.  We can only speculate as to 443 
why this is so. It may be that higher education leads subjects to think harder about more complex and 444 
unlikely phenomena such as the combined event of a landslide and fatalities. It may also be that more 445 
education reduces the role of fear or emotions which might otherwise be stronger when fatalities are 446 
involved. 447 
     Fear of avalanches is significantly and positive correlated with the variation in risk estimates, and in 448 
the first model whether the respondent has lost a friend or relative raises the risk estimation by about 12 449 
percentage points. In the fatal landslide model, females believe risks to be higher than males. Ho et al. 450 
(2008) also find that females express a higher likelihood that their lives will be threatened by floods or 451 
landslides, that they will experience a large financial loss, and a higher sense of fear or dread. In both of 452 
our models a good deal of the variation is being captured in the constant term: it is the largest single 453 
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contributor to the risk estimate, capturing other influences that are not random, but for which we have 454 
no data. 455 
Table 7 about here 456 
       Finally, the second estimate of deaths in the region could be considered a possible Bayesian update 457 
for the group provided with the risk information. [The own chance of death is also asked after 458 
information is provided, but was not asked before the information was given to the respondent.] In very 459 
simple models of Bayesian learning, the updated, or posterior estimate of risk is a function of the prior, 460 
formed with no or at least less information provided, and information that is given. Those who cling to 461 
their prior, not changing their minds after being given information, will weigh the prior heavily, while 462 
those who are strongly influenced by information of course weight it more heavily. The source of 463 
information provided to the subject may matter to some respondents, but our respondents are not given 464 
different sources of information. Because sample sizes are small, we pool the homeowners and visitors 465 
and compare the pre-and post information risk estimates for the subsample that is provided with the 466 
information.  Table 8 compares risk estimates for the 118 people who received the science-based risk 467 
information.   468 
Table 8 about here 469 
       In another related regression (with results not reported in table form here) we found that the initial 470 
death estimate (the prior) was positive and strongly significant in a regression using the second fatality 471 
estimate as the dependent variable; other variables were included as controls, but their influence was 472 
dominated by the first death estimate. The prior was quite significant for this group, and the higher the 473 
prior, the higher the second, updated estimate. 474 
 475 
4.2.Stated Choices for Debris Risk Reduction Programs 476 
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        Separate CE models for the two groups (Visitors vs. Homeowners) were estimated. Table 9 reports 477 
the results of a simple (multinomial logit, or MNL) model for Homeowners, and Table 10 reports the 478 
same for the Visitor sample. The usual MNL is based on the assumption that the respondents face 479 
certainty when they make their choices. Randomness typically arises only from our perspective, as 480 
researchers, who cannot see all that the decision maker can see.  This is not consistent with a more 481 
formal model of decision-making under conditions of risk or uncertainty. However, our use of the MNL 482 
can be seen as a reasonably appropriate model that includes risk beliefs.  483 
        In the survey, individual respondents see the attribute levels in relation to baseline levels and 484 
proportional changes in the baseline. An intercept variable is used to indicate a status quo choice (SQ); a 485 
positive significant coefficient indicates average preference for the status quo. 486 
The model results for Homeowners (Table 9) suggest that the tax, risk and status quo variables all are 487 
significant in their influence on the choice of alternatives, and all have the anticipated direction of 488 
influence on the choices. Higher taxes decrease the probability of choosing an alternative (holding other 489 
things equal), while larger risk reductions increase it. The negative sign on SQ indicates that on average, 490 
the sample is not in fact more likely to choose the status quo. The literature on this has suggested that 491 
respondents looking for an “easy” set of tasks just consistently chooses the SQ option, but we don’t find 492 
that here. Changes in insurance premiums do not seem to affect the choice of alternatives, perhaps 493 
because this monetary incentive is outweighed by the tax, in terms of importance, or perhaps because 494 
the premiums are small in comparison to the baseline values of the home. 495 
       The basic marginal WTP can be inferred by taking the ratio of one coefficient to the monetary 496 
coefficient. This naturally stems from the “value” concept in economics and the ratio of marginal utilities 497 
in the context of certainty. Ideally, one would want to construct a more carefully derived risk-related 498 
WTP measure, such as an option price,  but this would be more important when the estimated model 499 
strictly conformed with an EU model or one of its variants.  500 
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       Most choice models assume no income effects and a simple monetary cost. The marginal rate of 501 
substitution between other attributes and the cost variable defines a marginal WTP. The calculation is 502 
simple in linear models because it is just the ratio of coefficients on the respective variables. Our 503 
calculation is different. First, because our monetary coefficient is computed as a percentage increase in 504 
the tax, column four of Table 9 reports estimates of the marginal rate of substitution of the attributes in 505 
percentage terms for the sample, rather than for the population (in Euro). The four columns on the far 506 
right of Table 9 report four descriptive statistics of the sample welfare measures: the first and third 507 
quartile, the mean, and the median. Our welfare measures are calculated by multiplying the marginal 508 
rate of substitution of the attributes by the actual monetary tax rate for each respondent. It can be 509 
noted, for example, that three quarters of the sample is willing to pay up to almost 80 Euro per year to 510 
reduce the risk by 50% and the same proportion of respondents is willing to pay a larger amount of 511 
money (90 Euro) for a 75% risk reduction. This is consistent with economic theory, suggesting that WTP 512 
should increase, the larger the risk reduction. 513 
In the case of visitors, almost all of the attribute variables are significant with the expected direction of 514 
influence on route choices. Increased tolls and travel times decrease the probability of choosing an 515 
alternative, although the travel time levels that are significant are the 3 and 4 hour times. Scenic beauty 516 
is an important attractant to a route choice alternative, as expected.  Some visitors get pleasure out of a 517 
scenic drive, holding other factors constant. The two higher risk reductions are significant and on 518 
average, respondents do not choose the status quo in lieu of the alternatives. 519 
        In this case the monetary variable that generates the marginal WTP is the toll rate. The implied 520 
marginal WTP for a 50% reduction in risk is 3.23 Euro, and for a 75% reduction this rises to 5.68 Euro. 521 
One would expect that a larger risk reduction leads to a larger WTP.  The marginal WTP with respect to 522 
travel time is what transportation economists deem the “value of travel time saved,” or VTTS (see Patil 523 
et al., 2011, for example). The VTTS to avoid a 4 hour increase is 4.85 Euro. 524 
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Table 9 and Table 10 about here 525 
5. Summary/Conclusion 526 
     Subjective probabilities, or what psychologists deem risk beliefs or “perceived risks,” may matter a 527 
great deal when an individual makes choices that depend on risks. That is the case here, as the subjective 528 
probabilities for the sample are found to be different from so-called “science-based” risks (objective 529 
probabilities) for our study of landslide or mountain debris risk in Italy. Our focus is on use of these 530 
subjective probabilities in a choice model and as a first step, we have simply used these stated subjective 531 
probabilities as explanatory variables in a conventional stated choice model. To our knowledge, we are 532 
among the first economists to do so, (again, we note the discussion paper by Cerroni et al. 2015 is at 533 
least one exception), although many have incorporated subjective probabilities into other types of 534 
behavioral models (e.g. contingent valuation, and revealed preference), and of course many DCE 535 
modelers have included objective or science-based risk measures as attributes.  536 
     Our results have some implications for programs to reduce risks. First, for homeowners, they are 537 
sensitive to tax increases, so if cooperation from homeowners is sought large taxes may not be a wise 538 
way to proceed. Changing insurance premium may be a better payment mechanism because of a lower 539 
sensitivity. Second, small risk changes do not get much favor, so programs should likely try for larger risk 540 
reductions, if possible, while balancing that against cost.  Third, policies or programs for visitors might be 541 
tied to toll rates. As scenic beauty is important to road users, an ideal program might try to reduce risk 542 
while at the same time enhance, or at least not interfere with the scenic beauty of the viewscapes on 543 
access roads. 544 
     In future research, it would be interesting to try to more carefully flush out reasons for why 545 
respondents over-estimate most of the probabilities and death rates in this study, as compared to 546 
science-based risks. One possibility is that they were confused by the survey asking perhaps too many 547 
24 
 
risk questions, which differed from one another, but the pattern of over-estimation of risks is quite 548 
common across the literature we are familiar with. 549 
      As final caveats, first, we note that the ideal empirical WTP or DCE model may be more formal than 550 
what we have developed here, in that it could also specifically and carefully allow for violations of the 551 
expected utility assumptions. These assumptions include the usual assumption that the expected utility 552 
function is linear in probability. Our DCE model is consistent with the EU framework. Future work could 553 
involve one of the non-EU variants such as cumulative prospect theory (e.g. the earlier version by 554 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979; also see Huang et al. 2015) or rank dependent expected utility. Further 555 
investigations should allow for the possibility that non-expected utility behavior may be at work here, as 556 
has been previously found in other studies.  557 
     Second, we are aware that some thorny issues in econometrics may arise when incorporating such 558 
stated risks into behavioral models. We acknowledge that these might include potential endogeneity in 559 
the risk variable, as well as measurement error (see Kalisa et al. 2016). Dealing with these issues fully 560 
goes well beyond what we have done in this paper (see Riddel 2011). Nevertheless, intuition suggests 561 
that using subjective, instead of objective, risks will better explain choices that people make when the 562 
beliefs are quite different than what scientists estimate.  563 
     Finally, we note that the simple random utility model we use cannot easily incorporate individual 564 
characteristics that might more richly explain choices. Further research might more deeply explore the 565 
connections between different types of people, their tendency to perceive risks, and their decisions to 566 
make choices that involve risks. 567 
568 
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Table 1: Survey Versions, Responses for homeowners (H) and Visitors (V) 683 
Survey 
Version 
Description Number of responses 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Total 
H, given info, actual payment 
H, given info, no actual payment 
H, No info, actual payment 
H, No info, and no actual payment 
V, given info, actual payment 
V, given info, no actual payment 
V, No info, actual payment 
V, No info, no actual payment 
36 
36 
17 
16 
23 
23 
8 
9 
168 
 684 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, for Homeowners (N = 105) and Visitors (N = 63) 685 
Variable (mean or frequency) 
 
Homeowners Visitors 
Age 
Females 
Education 
 
 
 
 
 
Smoke 
Income* 
Engage risky activity? 
Heard of Landslides in Italy? 
Friend/relative lost in landslide? 
 
 
45.19 
66 (39 males) 
5 primary school 
17 middle 
51 high school 
6 BA degree 
16 MA degree 
10 (Phd, other) 
Yes = 25; No = 80 
29, 357 
Yes = 31; No = 74 
Yes = 105 (100%) 
Yes = 19; No = 86 
 
 
 
 
47.69 
43 (20 males) 
2 primary school 
15 middle 
25 high school 
4 BA degree 
14 MA degree 
3 (Phd, other) 
Yes = 12; No = 51 
29,404 
Yes = 10; No = 53 
Yes = 62; No = 1 
Yes = 2; No = 61 
Income recoded from five categories using the midpoint; first category is 0 to 15,000 Euro and the 
15,000 value is used for this category; top category is 60,000 Euro and over and 60,000 is used in 
calculation of mean 
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Table 3 - Attributes and levels for homeowners and visitors. 689 
Homeowners 
Attribute  Level 
 
Acronym 
Reduction in home insurance premium 3%, 5%, 7%, 10% InsPrem5, InsPrem7, 
InsPrem10 
Increased home value 0.5%, 1%, 3% HomeValue1, HomeValue3 
Mortality reduction risk 25%, 50%, 75% Risk5, Risk75 
Tax increase on properties 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% Tax 
Status Quo Opt out  SQ 
   
Visitors 
Attribute  Level 
 
Acronym 
Travel time 1, 2, 3, 4 hours TrTime2, TrTime3, TrTime4 
Scenic beauty of route attributes Low, medium, high SBeautyMed, SBeautyHigh 
Mortality reduction risk 25%, 33%, 50%, 75% Risk5, Risk33, Risk75 
Toll road to support the safety program €0.5, €1, €2, €3, Toll 
Status Quo Opt out  SQ 
 690 
Table 4 - Example of Choice-Set for Homeowners 691 
Which of the following alternative 
would you choose? 
Alternative A Alternative B Alternative C 
Reduction insurance premium 3% 10% 
None 
Increased home value 0.5% 1% 
Mortality reduction risk 25% 50% 
Tax increase  5%  20% 
Choice                                 
 692 
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Table 5 - Simple Statistics on Risk Estimates 694 
Variable 
 
Homeowners (N = 105) Visitors (N = 63) 
Before Information Given 
 
Chance of Landslide in region, 
annual (PRL) 
 
Chance of Fatal Landslide, 
annual, in region (PRFL) 
 
Estimated Deaths in next year, 
for regional residents and 
visitors (DR1) 
 
 
 
69.76% 
 
 
46.05% 
 
 
9.38 people 
 
 
63.88% 
 
 
47.46% 
 
 
13.16 people 
After Information Given 
 
Own Chance of Being killed, 
annual (PROD) 
 
Updated estimate of deaths in 
next year, for regional residents 
and visitors (DR2) 
 
 
 
15.18% (N = 72); 16 said 0 
 
 
11.99 people (N = 72) 
 
 
9.02% (N=46); 18 said 0 
 
 
15.96 people (N = 46) 
Estimated mean deaths calculated using ten recoded categories. The bottom bracket was zero; the top, 
more than 50 deaths. 72 of the 105 homeowners were provided information; 46 of the 63 visitors also 
were. Estimated deaths are per 5 million people in the regional population. 
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Table 6 - Fear of Certain Events 697 
Fear Factor Frequencies (%) in each response category 
(1 = not at all frightened to 5 = very frightened and scared) 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Accident at work 
 
40 24 23 8 5 
Theft 
 
7 
 
17 33 23 20 
Falling seriously Ill 
 
7   12 24 24 33 
Fire 
 
18  
 
26 26 14 17 
Avalanche 
 
21  21 21 16 21 
Earthquake 
 
10  18 15 23 34 
Floods 
 
9  19 20 21 31 
 
Selected Strong 
Correlations 
  
Correlation coefficient 
 
 
Flood and Avalanche 
 
0.490 
 
    
Flood and fire 
 
0.570 
 
    
Flood and earthquake 
 
0.820 
 
    
Earthquake and fire 
 
0.555 
 
    
Earthquake and avalanche 
 
0.510 
 
    
Avalanche and Accident at 
work 
 
0.436     
Avalanche and fire 
 
0.635 
 
    
Percentages are rounded up or down. All other correlation coefficients were less than 
0.40. 
 
 698 
  699 
35 
 
Table 7 - Pooled Risk Model Results 700 
Dependent Variable (DV) and Independent 
Variables 
Coefficients (T statistic)* 
Landslide Risk (DV) 
 
Education 
Avalanche Fear (=1) 
Age 
Lost friend or Relative (=1) 
Constant term 
R squared 
 
 
4.17  (2.68)*** 
2.80  (2.16)** 
0.14  (0.98) 
12.35 (2.22)** 
37.13 (3.22)*** 
0.08  
 
Chance of Fatal Landslide (DV) 
 
Education 
Avalanche 
Sex (Female = 1) 
Constant Term 
R squared 
 
 
-2.95 (-1.91)** 
3.64  (2.65)*** 
9.52  (2.26)** 
29.56 (4.99)*** 
0.12 
 
  
Indication of significance at 1, 5, 10% level with ***, **, or *, respectively.  
 701 
Table 8 - Comparison of pre-post risk estimates for Group Receiving Information (N = 118) 702 
Risk Variable Pooled Sample, with information 
 
Landslide risk (PRL – chance of any slide) 
 
Chance of death in typical year (for population) 
 
Estimate of Number Killed, typical year (for 
population) 
 
Chance of Own Death, annual (typical year) 
 
Estimate of annual Deaths after information 
provided 
 
 
67.63% (mean) 
 
46.57% 
 
9.30 people 
 
 
12.78% 
 
13.44 people 
 
Homeowners and Visitors combined, provided with risk information in the survey 
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Table 9 - Homeowners Choice (Multinomial Logit) Model 705 
 706 
Variable Coefficient |z-values| 
Marginal Rate 
Substit. (%) 
Welfare estimates of the sample (€) 
First 
quartile 
Third 
quartile 
Mean Median 
Tax -15.692 13.4 
     Insurance Prem 5% 0.216 1.2 0.014 4.9 14.0 12.0 8.4 
Insurance Prem 7% 0.077 0.5 0.005 1.8 5.1 4.4 3.1 
Insurance Prem10% 0.079 0.4 0.005 1.8 5.1 4.4 3.1 
HomeValue1 0.220 1.5 0.014 4.9 14.0 12.0 8.4 
HomeValue3 0.184 1.2 0.011 4.0 11.5 9.8 6.9 
Reduction Risk5% 1.239 7.4 0.079 27.7 79.0 67.6 47.4 
Reduction Risk75% 1.421 7.5 0.091 31.7 90.5 77.4 54.3 
SQ -0.767 3.8 -0.049 -49.1 -17.2 -42.0 -29.4 
          Log-likelihood -731.13 
          N. choices 840 
 707 
Table 10 - Visitors Choice (Multinomial Logit) Model   708 
Variable Coefficient |z-values| 
 
Marginal WTP (€) 
|z-values| 
Toll road -0.277 4.1 - - 
Travel Time 2% -0.501 1.4 -1.8 1.51 
Travel Time 3% -0.760 2.0 -2.7 2.04 
Travel Time 4% -1.344 5.0 -4.9 3.47 
Scenic Beauty Med 0.460 2.4 1.7 2.14 
Scenic Beauty High 1.071 3.2 3.9 2.39 
Reduction Risk 33% 0.172 0.7 0.6 0.72 
Reduction Risk 50% 0.895 2.1 3.2 2.08 
Reduction Risk 75% 1.574 4.6 5.7 3.09 
SQ -3.738 7.02 -13.5 3.96 
   
Log-likelihood -273.42 
   
N. choices 504 
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Figure 1 – Distribution of age by classes of homeowners (a) and visitors (b) 711 
a) Homeowners 712 
  713 
b) Visitors 714 
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Figure 2 – Distribution of income by classes of homeowners (a) and visitors (b) 717 
a) Homeowners 718 
 719 
b) Visitors 720 
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